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Abstract 
Armenia adopted a new constitution in 1995.  This predetermined the need for 
fundamental restructuring of the court system and provided the legal grounds for the 
organization and operation of the Armenian judiciary. The legal base for judicial 
reforms has been initiated, but the court management and administration system is still 
administered on an ad-hoc basis and requires a major overhaul. This paper offers a 
critique of the current Armenian policy approach, covering the legal environment, 
judicial budgeting, compensation and administration. Issues needing most attention are 
the lack of transparency and criteria for the appointment and evaluation of staff, the 
necessity for a legislative framework for court employment, and the role of the 
legislature in the budget process. In order to reform and modernize the judiciary, a 
statutory and policy framework for judicial employment needs developing. The 
judiciary’s management arrangements must also be enhanced, while the need to 
oversee and implement the reforms requires a strengthening of the judicial 
administration body. 
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Executive Summary 
The existing system of court administration in Armenia is recognized by many 
involved in the justice system as in need of substantial changes. The latter is 
particularly acute at the present stage of public administration reforms, where 
significant accomplishments have been registered in reforming the executive and 
legislative branches of Government, yet leaving out the judiciary. The lack of 
transparent and unified court administration structure and policies and uncertain status 
of court employees potentially give grounds for nepotism, arbitrary actions and intensify 
the decline in trust and confidence in courts administration system.  
In general, the judicial administration function in Armenia can be described as 
lacking a centralized and strong body that will be empowered to speak for the judiciary 
and provide professional and policy guidance to courts in the areas of finance and 
budgeting, strategic planning, human resources, case management, court performance 
and judicial ethics. 
At present, the judicial administration body is considered to be the Council of Court 
Chairman, which is represented by the chairmen of all courts in the Republic. The 
Council, however, does not appear to have been given by law, nor has it exercised 
major managerial responsibilities over the non-judicial functions of the courts. It is the 
executive branch – Ministry of Justice – that has a key role in the court administration 
and management. 
Key factors and the potential, needed for restructuring the court administration 
towards more effectiveness and efficiency, are present. This paper presents specific 
policy recommendations that will guide the implementation of judicial reforms. These 
include: 
• Development of a statutory and policy framework for judicial employment  
• Enhancing the judiciary’s management arrangements  
• Provision of a statutory basis for judicial branch compensation  
• Strengthening the judicial administration body to oversee and implement the 
reforms. 
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1 The Court Environment Background 
For more than seventy years, the courts of Armenia functioned under the “Soviet 
system” for courts. The Supreme Court acted as both an appeals court and a court of 
first instance. The Supreme Court judges and regional court judges heard cases with 
two, publicly-elected individuals representing major worker’s groups. 
In 1991, the Republic of Armenia (RA) declared independence from the Soviet 
Union.  However, the reform of the court system and its correspondence to the 
contemporary conditions and to the principles of democracy, rule of law and superiority 
of human rights, occurred later. On July 5, 1995, the new constitution of the 
independent Armenia was adopted by referendum. Towards the implementation of the 
constitutional provisions, the Law on the Constitutional Court was adopted in 1995 and 
the Constitutional Court was created. It predetermined the need for fundamental 
restructuring of the court system and provided the legal grounds for the organization 
and operation of the Armenian judiciary. It should be noted that the new court system is 
not the legal successor of the Soviet one. A three-tier system was introduced with the 
institute of review, which had not been present during the Soviet times.  
Since then, the normative [legal] base for judicial reforms has been initiated. In 
1998 several laws were adopted, in particular, the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes 
and the Law on Judiciary, which provided the foundation for creation and operation of 
the Armenian new judicial system. Article 10 of the Law on Judiciary prescribes the 
structure and order of formation of courts of general jurisdiction. Accordingly, the 
following courts currently operate in the republic:  
• Courts of First Instance  
• Courts of Appeals 
• Economic Court  
• Court of Cassation   
Another major change enforced with the adoption of the Law on Judiciary was the 
establishment of the judicial administration body – the Council of Court Chairmen 
(CCC). According to the statistics obtained from the judicial administration body, at 
present there is 1020 judicial and non-judicial staff in the courts of the Republic. Of this 
number 841 comprises the courts’ non-judicial staff, with a total of 179 judges in the 
country. 
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The most recent structural change in the Armenian court system occurred in the 
year 2001 when the Economic court was established to examine and re-examine all 
economic disputes in the country. Prior to that, the economic court was acting only in 
the form of the appeals court (Court of Appeals on Economic Cases) and the powers to 
resolve all economic disputes initially were vested to the courts of first instance. 
The existing system of court management and administration is recognized by 
many involved in the justice as in need of substantial changes. The current court 
administration system with the present position of the CCC impedes the overall court 
administration rather than facilitates it, The CCC does not appear to have been given 
by law, nor has it exercised major managerial responsibilities over the non-judicial 
functions of the courts, as reveled in the research.  
The lack of transparent and unified court administration structure and policies, 
uncertain status of court employees, and budgetary constraints foster conflicting, 
negligent and unmotivated working environments, potentially giving grounds for 
nepotism, arbitrary actions and intensifying the decline in trust and confidence in the 
courts administration system. The lack of information about courts and how they may 
be accessed to best serve peoples’ needs acts as an important barrier to access. In 
fact, the public is highly critical of some of the aspects of the justice system and these 
perceptions have eroded confidence in courts. The perception of courts comes from 
lack of civility from a few overworked or under-trained staff, from regular delays in the 
procedures, from the fear of processes and lack of knowledge about them. Clearly, the 
issues here relate to the overall management and administration of justice.  
2 Critique of the Current Policy Approach  
2.1 Assessing the Legal Environment 
The status of courts’ staff is extremely unsatisfactory, including the lack of 
transparency and clear criteria for appointment, absence of any criteria and mechanism 
for evaluation of their work and for promotion, insufficient training, and so on. 
The recent change of the Chairman of the Cassation Court and the resultant 
significant replacements in the staff of the Court prove the absence of any processes 
for selection and appointment, thus leaving everything to the discretion of court 
chairmen. In July 2005, the Chairman of the Economic Court was appointed as the 
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Chairman of the Cassation Court and, as was observed, many of the existing staff 
members at the Cassation were immediately replaced by the candidates of the newly 
appointed chairman. 
Court employees are outside the broad umbrella of the State Service, which 
includes the Civil Service, the Police, the Custom Service, the Diplomatic Service, the 
National Assembly and Emergency Services. There is no legislative framework for 
court employment that provides for employee status, criteria for admission to and 
withdrawal from service or salary setting as was established for State Service 
employees within the framework of recent public administration reforms. There are no 
job descriptions or similar documents that define the roles and functions of each 
position, no performance evaluation standards or criteria that can be taken into account 
when awarding bonuses to court employees. Unlike the judicial branch, political, 
discretionary and support positions were clearly separated in the executive branch, and 
equality based criteria for admission to and withdrawal from civil service and job 
descriptions established.   
Since the establishment of the Judicial Education Center (2001), only two training 
sessions for court staff, focusing on case management and organization of court 
sessions, have been conducted; in cooperation with a donor project in 2001. Problems 
include: a lack of funding; lack of a clear mission, strategic vision and an explicit 
training policy and procedure. Provided that no actions are taken to formalize the 
training requirement, the situation will deteriorate and judicial and non-judicial training 
will depend only on donor support, and only within the narrow subject areas that are in 
the interest of donors.  
Moreover, several legal issues emerge in relation to the appointment of court staff. 
There is a contradiction in the existing Law on Judiciary (1998), Law on Judges’ Status 
(1998) and the Law on Public Administration Institutions (2001). Under the Law on 
Judiciary, the court staff is appointed and dismissed by the Chairman of the respective 
court within the limits of staff size and salary fund established by the Government. 
Appointment and dismissal decisions for judge assistants and court session secretaries 
are made upon recommendation of the respective judge. The Law on Public 
Administration Institutions (PAIs) envisages that the founder of the institution appoints 
and dismisses the Head of Staff as well as other employees of the institution in the 
cases specified by the Charter. However, the charter does not specify, at least directly, 
the mentioned rule.  
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There are further inconsistencies between the laws and the internal charters of the 
first instance courts. Specifically, the charters provide that the founder of the staff is the 
chairman of the court. Under Article 7.1 of the Law on PAIs the founder of the 
institution is the Republic of Armenia. In the name of the Republic, the founder for the 
courts is the chairman of the Court of Cassation.  
Subsequently, the chairman of the first instance court exercises the governance of 
the staff according to point 13 of its charter. In contradiction to this provision, Article 
10.1 of the Law on PAIs determines that the governance of the institution shall be 
carried out by the founder. Hence, all authorities granted to the chairman by point 14 of 
the charter belong to the chairman of the Court of Cassation according to the Article 11 
of the Law.  
It is believed that there are unreasonable and unjustified powers and rights vested 
with the chairman of the Court of Cassation with regard to organizational and personnel 
management of all courts (art. 11, Law on Public Administration Institutions). The court 
chairmen should have some of the authorities, which are mentioned in their internal 
charters, however, appropriate changes in the Law on PAIs have to be made. 
2.2 Judicial Budgeting  
The budget process begins in June with the Prime Minister’s Decree and 
presentation by the Ministry of Finance and Economy of a fiscal framework for the next 
three years, including total amounts for each budget entity. In the fall, the Ministry 
sends methodological instructions to budget users. After compilation by the 
government, the draft budget is forwarded to the National Assembly. The legislature is 
a weak participant in the budget process, having no staff and operating under a 
requirement that it vote on government budget proposals within 24 hours. Any objection 
to the budget constitutes a “no-confidence” vote in the government and carries serious 
consequences. 
Because in the first instance, economic and appeal courts are budget users with 
their own accounts and budget requests are made by each court, the Government 
distributes funds to individual courts on a quarterly basis. The requests to transfer 
funding between budget items at an individual court can be made only with the prior 
approval of the Ministry of Finance or the Government.  
The CCC’s role in the judicial branch budgeting process is limited to receiving the 
government’s budget instructions, meeting with the courts to discuss them, compiling 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES/INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2005/06 
 9 
and signing the budgets and mid-year projections from the courts and serving as the 
contact point for questions from the Ministry of Finance and Economy. The CCC does 
not alter amounts requested by the courts. Funding norms are applied by the 
Government to some categories of expenditures, including electricity, automobile fuel 
and expenses, sanitary supplies, telephones and the number of janitorial staff. 
Nonetheless, if the CCC receives a budget with requests outside these norms, it does 
not adjust the request or contact the court to discuss it.  
Debts incurred by the courts, primarily in the areas of communications and utilities, 
are transferred from one year to the next unless the government can absorb them, with 
no changes in the formulas to reflect actual expenditures. A court’s debt could continue 
to grow as a result of fixed funding formulas, for example, if the amount allocated for 
electricity is not changed and debt is moved forward into that category.  
Performance data is not considered in the budget requests; there is no linkage with 
requests and filings or dispositions; there are no narratives presented with the budget.  
The CCC and the courts themselves participate very little in the formulation of the 
final mid-term (three-year) fiscal figures. The mid-year figures only reflect the already-
approved legal changes, for example, the addition of an auditor for each court. There is 
no process for requesting funds for improving existing operations; the courts are not 
provided with an opportunity to review the salary schedule for staff.  
There is no forum for the courts to discuss their budget requests with the CCC, the 
Government or the Parliament. The CCC also plays no advocacy role on behalf of the 
courts’ budgets. The ABA/CEELI has also reported that the judiciary has a limited 
ability to influence decisions concerning its funding. 
2.3 Judicial Compensation  
The current compensation levels for like positions in the judicial and executive 
branches vary significantly, with the judicial branch salaries being lower. It is 
understood that salary rates for like positions in different courts fluctuate as a result of 
the current salary setting procedure and mechanisms. Therefore, it is becoming 
problematic to secure engagement of qualified staff, encouraging high performance 
and continuous improvement of employee’s professional qualifications.  
Given the existing salary setting mechanism, the courts do not have an opportunity 
to review the salary schedule for court staff during the mid-year projections. 
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Specifically, the Government decree
1
 establishes the minimum official salary rates for 
staff and technical support personnel of courts of the first instance, Appeals Court, 
Economic Court and Court of Cassation. Subsequently, in accordance with the Law on 
Judiciary, the Court Chairmen determine the actual salary rates within the limits of the 
salary fund established by the Government.  
Not only that the courts cannot provide for salary adjustments, but, in fact, minimum 
salary rates can be reduced by the Government decree, providing no protection to staff 
from disparate treatment. 
In contrast, compensation levels of executive branch employees are established in 
accordance with the RA Law on Civil Servants Pay adopted in 2002. The civil service 
pay system is based on the classification grades of civil service posts and envisages a 
separate salary scale for each group and sub-group of civil service posts. Salary raise 
mechanisms, bonuses and other allowances are also defined in the Law on Civil 
Servants Pay. 
2.4 Judicial Administration Body 
There is a discrepancy between the provisions on the CCC mandate stated in the 
Law on Judiciary and the Charter of the CCC, with a resultant ambiguity in its 
authorities. Because the CCC is considered a collegial body under Armenian law, its 
directives and regulations are advisory only.  
Article 28 of the Law provides that the CCC shall operate on the basis of the Code 
of Rules approved by the CCC. While article 3 of the CCC Code of Rules refers to the 
CCC as a judicial administration body, the grounds for such a statement are not 
provided in the Law. Moreover, Article 27 of the Law delegates certain policy/procedure 
development powers and authority to the CCC leaving out the issue of enforcement 
and supervision of these policies/procedures.   
Concurrently, Article 30/7 of the RA Law on Judge’s Status under chapter “Grounds 
for Termination of a Judge’s Powers” provides that “…judge’s powers can be 
terminated if he/she committed an action which is a ground for termination of powers 
according to the “Code of Judge’s Conduct”. Therefore, it can be assumed from this 
statement that the Code of Conduct/Code of Ethics adopted by the CCC has an 
enforcement power, which contradicts to the “advisory body” character of the CCC. 
                                            
1
 RA Government Decision N914-N of the ‘On official salary rates of the staff and technical staff of the RA 
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3 Policy Options  
3.1 Develop Legislative Framework for Judicial Employment 
The status and working relations of judicial employees, the rights and authorities 
thereof should be regulated by a separate law on Judicial Service, rather than 
amending the existing legislative and statutory framework. The key elements of the 
new legislation providing sufficient professionalism of and protection for court 
employees should include competitive selection procedures, regular attestation 
(performance evaluation), training, discipline, provision of benefits, and protection from 
arbitrary actions. 
3.1.1 Uniform Selection and Grading of Judicial Servants 
The principles of open competition and selection based on merit should be 
introduced. This implies application of mandatory announcement of vacant positions in 
newspapers, establishing selection committees, selecting employees according to 
objective hiring criteria that may include passage of a position-specific examination 
(test, interview).  
There should be a clear distinction between the professional staff and technical 
staff in the courts. The terms “judicial service2” and, accordingly, “judicial servants” are 
proposed for usage, since the RA Law on Civil Service already provides that the 
Judicial Service, together with other special services, is considered as a State Service 
[National Assembly, Diplomatic, National Security, Internal Affairs, Tax, etc.”. 
Therefore, the framework and principles set forth in the Law on Civil Service are 
taken as a basis for the development of the new classification scheme for the positions 
in the judicial service. This approach would enable and ensure appropriate transfers 
between jobs in the state service in terms of work experience, classification grades, 
pay schemes and other considerations. 
Both the Law on Civil Service and the Law on Public Service in the Staff of National 
Assembly identify 4 classification groups: (a) highest, (b) chief, (c) leading, and (d) 
junior. The highest group is divided into 2 sub-groups, whereas the other classification 
groups have 3 sub-groups, with the 1
st
 subgroup being considered as the highest.  
                                                                                                                                            
Court of Cassation’, Court of Appeals, Economic Court and First Instance Court” dated 23 July 2003. 
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Considering the peculiarity of the judicial service with a limited number of position 
categories/titles, the following options on the classification
3
 are proposed. Certainly, 
allocation of the existing position categories/titles into the new classification groups 
should be based on the evaluation of the job functions, however, a preliminary 
estimation can be made as follows: 
 
Option A 
This option suggests distribution of positions into the same 4 classification groups 
as in the Civil Service: (a) highest, (b) chief, (c) leading, and (d) junior. However, the 
sub-groups will be limited to 1 in the highest group, and 3 subgroups in the chief and 2 
subgroups in the leading and junior groups. 
  
 Highest Chief Leading Junior 
1
st
  
Head of Staff 
 
Accountant, 
IT 
Archivist, 
Cashier, Inventory, 
Commandant 
2
nd
  
Office Manager, 
Internal auditor 
Office Secretary, 
Session Secretary 
Clerk 
3
rd
 
Head of Staff of 
judicial admin body 
Judge Assistant   
 
Option B 
This option envisages distribution of positions into 3 classification groups: (a) chief, 
(b) leading, and (c) junior with 3 subgroups in the chief- and leading groups, and 2 
subgroups in the junior group.  
 Chief Leading Junior 
1
st
 
Head of Staff of judicial 
admin. body 
Judge Assistant 
Archivist, 
Cashier, 
Inventory, Commandant 
2
nd
 Head of court Staff 
Accountant, 
IT 
Clerk 
                                                                                                                                            
2
 This includes service in courts and in the judicial management body.  
3
 The proposed classification schemes are not based on the current work responsibilities and functions, 
but assume new professional duties for judge assistants (legal research, drafting decisions, verdicts, etc.) 
and other positions. 
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3
rd
 
Office Manager, 
Internal Auditor 
Office Secretary, 
Session Secretary 
 
 
Option C 
This option suggests distribution of positions into 3 classification groups: (a) chief, 
(b) leading, and (c) junior with 2 subgroups in the chief group, and 3 subgroups in the 
leading and junior groups.  
 Chief Leading Junior 
1
st
 Head of Staff Judge Assistant Office Secretary 
2
nd
 Office Manager 
Accountant, 
Internal auditor 
Cashier 
3
rd
  
Specialist, 
Court session Secretary, 
Archivist 
Clerk 
 
Any judicial service post will be filled through a two-stage competition (written 
examination and a personal interview). Candidates should be selected based on 
qualifications called for in the job descriptions. Successful candidates would be 
required to possess the minimum requirements and then be ranked according to the 
strength of their qualifications. Examination of candidates should focus not only on the 
knowledge required by court staff but also the necessary skills and abilities.   
A probation period for up to 6 months after a candidate is selected and appointed 
should be envisaged.  
3.1.2 Job Descriptions  
The practice of job descriptions is to be introduced to allow avoiding overlap of 
functions, defining reporting relationships and ensuring that similar position holders in 
the same-jurisdiction courts have similar rights, duties and responsibilities. It is 
recommended that model job descriptions be created for judicial service positions by 
the judicial administration body with the input from courts. The courts should be 
allowed to create job descriptions more specific to their positions as long as these fall 
within the scope of the broader model description and in a format approved by the 
central judicial management body. 
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To serve as a tool that provides guidance for hiring, promoting and determining pay, 
job descriptions should: 
• clarify the reporting relationships,  
• outline the scope of work, 
• define the specific duties of the position,  
• define the minimum required and desirable qualifications. 
3.1.3 Attestation or Performance Appraisal  
Regular, annual performance reviews by the immediate supervisor needs to be 
introduced in the new legislation on judicial service. This is a novel concept for the 
court system. Moreover, the proposed mechanism differs considerably from the 
attestation procedure applied in the civil service, which is conducted once every three 
years through a formal committee evaluation, does not link performance with pay, and 
has proved inefficient so far.  
It is suggested that performance of judicial servants be evaluated in a two-stage 
process: first, providing a written evaluation in accordance with special forms; then, 
discussing the past performance, accomplishments and shortcomings as well as the 
future targets in an informal face-to-face interview.  
Probationary employees will be evaluated at the end of the probationary period in 
order to assess satisfactory performance for the purpose of attaining permanent job 
status.  
In evaluating an employee's performance, the supervisor should consider the 
fulfillment by the employee of the tasks laid out in the job description and the 
employee's attainment of previously set objectives and goals.  Other factors that are to 
be considered include, but are not limited to, knowledge of the job, creativity, flexibility, 
quantity and quality of work, promptness in completing assignments and 
comprehension of training provided in the previous period. It is essential that the 
evaluation criteria be objective; job-related; relate to specific functions, not global 
assessments, and be within the control of the evaluator, i.e. be measurable.  
The performance will be documented on a separate evaluation form developed and 
approved by the judicial administration body. Upon completion of the performance 
appraisal, the supervisor should share the data with employee for his comments. An 
employee may submit a rebuttal to the performance evaluation, which shall become a 
part of the evaluation. He or she may also request a review by the higher authority, 
whose decision on the matter will be final.  
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To ensure unbiased, objective and constructive evaluations, the policy 
implementation will require that evaluation procedures:  
• be standardized and uniform for all employees;  
• be formally communicated to employees, i.e. employees should be provided with 
an oral interview and a written statement of their appraisal, as well as the 
opportunity to acknowledge in writing receipt or review of the appraisal; 
• provide notice of performance deficiencies, and opportunities to correct them;  
• provide access for employees to review appraisal results; 
• provide formal appeal mechanisms that allow for employee input;  
• provide unbiased rating mechanisms 
• allow for multiple reviewers when the employee has a dual reporting relationship;  
• provide written instructions and training for appraisers to identify and correct 
practices that might generate legal liability.  
Moreover, at present the judicial branch supervisors lack the necessary skills as 
well as the authority for conducting performance reviews. It is also apparent that there 
is a "culture of sensitivity" toward criticizing others. For that reason, supervisors should 
be properly trained to give both sides of an employee’s work performance and constant 
communication with court employees should be assured for consistency and fairness in 
evaluations. 
3.1.4 Training 
The training requirements of non-judicial staff in the courts should be stipulated in 
the new legislation on judicial service. The law should provide for the minimum in-
service training requirements and a minimal level of funding to be guaranteed for 
training purposes. The Law on Civil Service requires a mandatory in-service training 
every three years, without specifying the types of measures that are considered as 
training and counted towards this requirement. Instead, in the judicial legislation it is 
suggested to specify the number of minimum training hours that any judicial servant 
should undertake within a specified time-period. The consequences of non-attendance 
or obtaining a “fail” result at the end of the training course should be clearly stated in 
the law. It is important to outline the types of training activities that are regarded as 
mandatory as well as the training institutions that can provide training to judicial 
servants. The more detailed methodological and organizational procedures will then be 
developed and approved by the judicial administration body.  
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3.2 Judicial Budgeting 
3.2.1 Set budgetary priorities 
To begin with, each court should determine its priority needs in the areas of 1) 
current expenses (types of procurement, equipment maintenance, areas of debt), 2)-
workload growth and 3) new initiatives (e.g. automation, establishment of resource 
center).  These would help in developing the budget requests and mid-term projections 
in a more effective and accurate manner. This would also guide the judicial 
administration body in strategic planning and priority setting for the judiciary as a whole. 
3.2.2  Create instructions for budget drafting and budget forecasting 
In order to strengthen the budget submission of the courts, explicit procedures and 
instructions for the budget development are needed. Budget requests are to be linked 
to filings and other workload data. These will measure the inputs in the budget process. 
The policies and instructions should be issued by the judicial management body and be 
discussed each year with the financial persons from all courts.  
3.2.3 Provide budget narratives with the budget requests  
Submitting budget narratives should be a required part of the budget request. The 
narrative should focus not only on how the costs are derived, but importantly, on the 
operational justifications and benefits of proposals. The specific format for the courts to 
follow may be developed and put into practice by the judicial administration body.  
3.2.4 Develop an Integrated Budget for the Judiciary 
One of the options to improve planning and create a stronger bargaining position for 
the judiciary vis-à-vis the government is to redefine the judiciary as a single budget 
user and develop and submit a single judicial branch budget to the government. This 
approach would also imply granting more authority for the judicial branch to approve 
movement of funds across courts as needed and perhaps approval of funds for new 
positions in the courts.  
The judicial branch budgeting process, overall, is proposed for implementation 
through the following mechanism: individual courts should submit the draft annual 
budget with a narrative to the Judicial Administration Council (see the structure below). 
The Budgeting division of the Council should have authority to elaborate and 
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consolidate the budget of the judicial system, which will be subject to approval by the 
Judicial Administration Council. The budget request for the judiciary should be 
incorporated in the draft state budget without any changes by the Government. The 
Government can only express an opinion about the budget and present justifications 
for its suggestions during the discussions in the Parliament. Possession of the financial 
means by courts should be supervised by the Judicial Administration Council (Audit 
division) through internal and external audits.  
3.3 Provide a Statutory Basis for Judicial Remuneration 
It has been already three years since the introduction of a new remuneration 
structure in the public sector. The Law on Civil Service Pay (2002) regulates the 
compensation mechanism of civil servants as well as public servants of the Parliament.  
According to this model, the salary of a public servant is formed from the main and 
supplementary pay. The main salary is related to and calculated for each subgroup of 
positions and is presented by a scale of minimum and maximum amounts. This scale is 
being calculated on the basis of the base rate established annually in the state budget. 
The supplementary pay is envisaged in the case of special working conditions, extra 
pay for classification grades, etc. 
It is without doubt that the judicial compensation should be governed by a law, 
rather than leaving this area to the Government’s discretion expressed in a form of 
Government Decrees. Towards this end, the civil service remuneration model can be 
approximated for the regulation of remuneration of the judicial servants, since it meets 
the main objectives of the compensation system – fair, adequate, and similar pay for 
analogous positions. It is proposed to use the same principles and coefficients and 
further elaborate the scheme by envisaging performance bonuses under the 
supplementary pay. 
3.4 Strengthen the Judicial Administration Body 
First, the formal mandate of the judicial management body should be defined in the 
law. The role of the body for strategic planning, budget management, and expenditure 
monitoring needs to be substantially enhanced. This can be done either within the 
present institution or through the creation of a new one. Most of stakeholders 
expressed the opinion that the judiciary should have its own strong central authority. 
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The structure and authorities of the judicial administration body should be stipulated in 
the Law on Judiciary. In particular, the administrative body should have the following 
powers: 
• Creating common personnel policies for the courts 
• Establishing and enforcing case management procedures 
• Conducting external audits of the courts 
• Introducing policies for developing budgets and linking these to filings and other 
workload data 
• Preparing the budgetary request for the whole judiciary based on the requests 
received from the courts and presenting it to the executive and legislature 
• Pursue strategic goals on a single front for all of the courts of the Republic.  
• Developing judicial and non-judicial training 
• Managing international relations  
• Representing the judiciary in relations with the executive branch and legislature 
• Statistical reporting from the courts and providing analysis and review of court 
practice based on the statistical data and reports received from the courts.  
De jure strengthening of the judicial administration would indisputably require 
improvements in staffing and technical capacity. It will be necessary to create new 
positions and equip the staff with computers connected via LAN, e-mail, internet 
access and printers. Training on strategic planning, personnel management functions, 
expenditure monitoring and forecasting, budget preparation and drafting budget 
narratives for the existing and new staff of the administration body need to be 
conducted. 
For the formation of an entity to provide policy and management direction to the 
courts, a Judicial Administration Council (JAC) can be established within the existing 
Council of Court Chairmen. The Council will have a Head of Staff and Deputy Head of 
Staff or Secretary of the Council, who will coordinate the activities of relevant 
departments at the JAC. Figure one in Annex one contains a representation of the 
structure. 
4 Conclusion and Recommendations 
The Armenian court administration and management is executed on an ad-hoc 
basis and its principles and procedures vary from court to court, with the resultant low 
level of public trust in the courts system. The court administration area, as a whole, 
lacks the necessary legislative framework which would set forth the uniform principles 
and practices across all courts in the Republic. Importantly, the system is in need of a 
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strong, powerful centralized administration body that would be empowered to act and 
speak for the judiciary. A complex and multi-tiered structure for planning and 
administering the courts is needed.  
This requires implementation of a set of practical recommendations aimed at 
reforming and modernizing the judiciary. These steps are intended to achieve 
elimination of the major gaps in the Armenian judicial administration, as revealed 
during the research. These gaps include (i) the lack of a centralized and strong body 
that will be empowered to speak for the judiciary and provide professional and policy 
guidance to the courts; (ii) the major and substantial involvement of the executive 
branch in the court administration, which is a result of having a weak administration 
body; and (iii) absence of any legal/procedural framework regulating judicial branch 
employment and compensation.  
These policy actions will result in the (i) improvement of the court administration 
function, establishment of good governance through improving the principles and 
mechanisms of governance, (ii) improvement of the administrative efficiency and 
inculcating a sense of courts as institutions providing a service to the public rather than 
a purely bureaucratic system of control, (iii) functioning of a strong centralized judicial 
administration body, responsible for unified court management system, (iv) increasing 
the courts’ operating efficiency and transparency, (v) speeding up the delivery of 
justice, and ultimately (vi) improvement of public satisfaction with the courts.  
The following measures, therefore, need to be taken in the priority order identified 
below: 
• Draft a separate legislation on judicial service, 
• Define the structure and status of the court staff, 
• Establish the formal enhanced mandate of the judicial administration body in the 
law to strengthen its status and authorities de-jure,  
• Restructure the judicial administration body in terms of staffing, operations, and 
technical capacities, 
• Strengthen the advocacy, strategic planning, management and oversight capacity 
of the staff of the central body through special training courses, 
• Establish a unified competition-based system with clear criteria for selection, 
appointment, appraisal of the court staff, 
• Consider the Civil Service Pay scheme for regulating the remuneration of court 
staff, 
• Consider developing an integrated budget for the judiciary and promote this 
proposal in the Ministry of Finance, 
• Perform optimization of staff functions in line with the overall re-structuring efforts, 
• Develop job descriptions for each judicial service position,  
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• Introduce performance appraisal criteria and procedure with the provision of a 
possibility for career advancement/promotion of staff,  
• Define a consistent training policy for staff. Particular emphasis should be given to 
improvement of the service delivery, managerial capacity and leadership in 
courts.  
